Indigenous peoples around the world and particularly in Latin America are struggling to strengthen their control over land and the territories they inhabit. The strengthening of rights has come as a result of multiple processes both at national and global levels, in which the role and responsibilities of states have been transformed. Transnational processes challenge the presumed association between nation-states, sovereignty and territoriality.
Introduction
Media and activists have used the term "carbon cowboys" to call attention to seemingly unruly actors who seek to gain control over the forestlands and carbon of indigenous people around the world. In this paper I use the carbon cowboy controversy to discuss some tensions between indigenous peoples´ newly gained rights regarding land and the role of the state. Indigenous peoples around the world and particularly in Latin America are struggling to strengthen their control over land and the territories they inhabit.
This struggle for rights has come as a result of multiple processes both at national and global levels, in which the role and responsibilities of states have been transformed. This happens within the context of a changing global development agenda, which is to a great extent influenced by ideas related to the role of privatization and commodification of nature and markets in governing the environment.
In the first section of the paper I discuss how REDD (Reducing emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) and carbon markets fit within the discourse of environmental governance influenced by ideas related to the transfer of responsibilities from the state to other actors, including international organizations, transnational networks and corporations, local governments, NGOs and others. I then discuss the processes that allowed indigenous people to fight for stronger recognition of their land rights. In doing so, I will highlight the role of several actors across diverse geographical scales and the political context that was conducive to such changes. I also highlight the geographical overlap of forestlands and indigenous territories. Against that backdrop in the third section I situate the position of indigenous peoples' organizations in Latin America in relation to REDD, highlighting that there are divergent and at times conflicting positions in regards to REDD among indigenous peoples organizations. Some of them see REDD as an opportunity to strengthen their land and territorial rights and to receive direct funding from REDD, but are confronted with the dilemma of how to distinguish between legitimate and fraudulent actors. I then use the analogy of "frontiers" to highlight how, while indigenous territories and forest areas have gained international attention in regards to forestlands as means to address climate change; they are often ignored or abandoned by the state. That state absence might be one of the factors explaining why so-called carbon cowboys emerge in frontier areas. In the two subsequent sections I use an empirical example from Colombia to discuss how carbon cowboys try to gain access to indigenous peoples lands -using dubious means; the demands from indigenous peoples organizations to the state; and the response from the government. In the last section of the paper I present a discussion and conclusion section in which I argue that REDD can be thought about as a scheme to improve forest governance in which various governance scales converge from the local to the global. This poses important dilemmas, as REDD proponents at these various scales, are a range of diverse actors with heterogeneous interests and resources. At the same time governments and state apparatuses do not share a single vision about forest areas, insofar as they are seen as relevant for climate mitigation and at the same time as places where different activities implemented to enhance economic development, like mining, infrastructure, dams etc connect with the drivers of deforestation.
Environmental governance, carbon cowboys and indigenous peoples
The concept of environmental governance is closely connected to neoliberal reforms and ideology (cf. Corbera and Schroeder 2011) . Neo-liberal transformations have involved the transfer of some responsibilities from the state to other actors, upward to international organizations, transnational networks and companies; downward to local governments and other domestic administrative units and; outward to communities, NGOs and quasiautonomous non-governmental organizations (Pierre and Peters 2000) . Forests have increasingly become the focus of global interest as concerns about global warming and climate change rise in international policy debates. Forests are seen as storehouses of global value for their contribution to carbon sequestration and climate mitigation (Fairhead and Leach 2003; Peet et al. 2011 ).
Despite years of discussion it still remains unclear how REDD is going to be funded, if at all in the long run. It is assumed that REDD will probably be funded by carbon markets or by a global fund or most likely by a combination of both (Bumpus and Liverman 2011) .
However, even when the mechanism for funding is not clear, a myriad initiatives and projects have been launched in Latin America and other parts of the global South (AguilarStøen et al. 2015; Corbera and Schroeder 2011) . This has often resulted in a variety of uncoordinated, multi-level, multi-purpose and multi-actor projects and in the emergence of contested interests and claims with implications for implementation trajectories, frequently running ahead of policy processes coordinated by the state (Aguilar-Støen 2015) .
Carbon markets constitute a more business-friendly alternative than direct regulatory control of the drivers of greenhouse gas emissions. Carbon markets also represent new forms of environmental governance. Carbon markets were included in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 after demands from particularly the USA. In 2000 Europe followed suit and eventually became the world's largest carbon market (the EU Emissions Trading Scheme-EU ETS) (Lohmann 2012) . In 2014 the global value of carbon markets grew to €45 billion and it is expected to grow to record volume in 2017. 1 Carbon markets fall within the neoliberal trend of privatization and marketization of public goods, and of the state and its functions, as well as the expansion of the frontiers of commodification of nature. This trend results in upwards wealth redistribution but requires new international treaties, property right regimes and agreements between governments and private actors. Carbon markets also reflect the increasing dominance of finance in economics and politics and the accelerated business's assimilation of labour, land, raw materials and public and smaller private enterprises in new arenas (Lohmann 2012) . Carbon markets depend on regulation but at the same time the state is dependent on the private sector for its understanding of how carbon trade works, and as a consequence traditional divisions between market and regulations disappear (Lohmann 2012 ).
Since 2007 carbon cowboys have received regular attention from the media along with other scandals related to carbon markets. Media present carbon cowboys as a sign that there is a need for tools that would allow identifying corruption in carbon markets. The way in which the media and some scholars (e.g de Jong et al. 2014) portray carbon cowboys, as only an issue of regulation, might contribute to prevent a more profound examination into the structure of carbon markets. Recognizing indigenous peoples' rights appealed to ruling elites as a way for the state to signalize attention to citizen's claims in a context in which the state was less able to meet their material demands (Van Cott 2000) . The negative effects of neoliberal policies on indigenous livelihoods probably provided the impetus for increased indigenous mobilization and in some cases those mobilizations were successful enough to force states to negotiate (Yashar 1999 ). All the above is not to say that racism and ethnic discrimination have ended in Latin America. Indigenous peoples continue to be targets of violence and political repression and many of the older exclusionary structures remain intact. But there were some important changes in indigenous politics that set the stage to understand indigenous involvement in or rejection of REDD.
Indigenous politics and their search for recognition of indigenous identities and the legitimacy of their claims pursue a strategy of cultural and historical revival as a means to achieve some autonomy and self-determination, to convince legislators and funding agencies of the validity of other claims such as those related to land tenure and control over natural resources. This happens, however, in a context in which a range of other actors like mining companies, ranchers, guerillas, the military, paramilitaries, oil companies, loggers, drug traffickers and others, claim, inhabit or want to control the very lands occupied by indigenous peoples. I will come back to this issue later. First I will briefly present the background for the recognition of land rights by some indigenous peoples.
Neoliberal ideology identifies the lack of clear property rights as a barrier for economic development. On the other hand theoretical frames like that advanced by Ostrom and collaborators (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1994 ) challenged ideas related to the relation between collective property rights and environmental degradation (Hardin 1968) opening up space for the legitimacy of collective claims to the land. The ILO 169 convention affirmed indigenous land rights and introduced the term 'territory' to refer to indigenous land holdings. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples does not address the issue of property rights but asserts the right of indigenous people to not be removed from their lands and territories. The declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples of the Inter-American Commission on Human rights, while recognizing indigenous territorial rights ensures that indigenous territories will not challenge the sovereignty of the states. At the same time, the idea of "community conservation" by way of which local communities would become responsible for protecting natural resources in the territories these communities occupy, resonated with neoliberal ideas of privatization of nature conservation (Vogel 1992) These range from the lack of a legitimate and identifiable interlocutor to the lack of clear rules of operation. Frontier areas are characterized by grey zones in which "the rules of the game" might be other than those imagined in ministries, governmental offices, UN agencies, financial institutions etc.
Let me use an empirical example to illustrate. One of my interviewees in Colombia, who I had been told could be described as a carbon cowboy, spoke candidly about his goal of earning money while conserving the forest and supporting the economic development of indigenous peoples in the Amazon. Confronted with lack of clarity as to how the government was going to implement REDD, his company went ahead, setting their own principles and definitions. To him and his company REDD was clearly a business opportunity and he did not hide his interest in such an opportunity. The alliances built between NGOs, the private sector and international research institutions contribute to the creation of norms accepted as valid to govern the conduct of those involved in REDD pilot projects. These norms are shaping the direction of REDD in Colombia even before the government has managed to put in place a plan of action Discussion and conclusion A very simplistic view would be to argue that REDD is fostering processes in which elites and capitalists, in this case big international NGOs, international research institutions, carbon verification companies, and carbon corporations are doing business as usual, using REDD and the government to extract resources from poor indigenous communities and in the same effort making unruly actors (e.g. carbon cowboys) illegal. This is an account which I would like to challenge -or at least nuance. James Scott shows how states seek to impose simplified and officially legible landscapes on pacified civil societies, describing for example scientific forestry, and how that had devastating environmental and social consequences (Scott 1998 ). Scott also argues that state apparatuses constantly struggle to impose simplification to be able to count and measure in order to extract value from forests. Scott suggests that states construct simplified models of the world that they would like to control and improve, but more often than not, such improvement schemes fail because they prevent people to apply their quotidian knowledge that is crucial to their own wellbeing. REDD can be thought about as a scheme to improve the human condition at the global, national and local levels. Its proponents are different actors at various scales, from the World Bank and the UN-REDD, to governments in industrialised and developing countries, different agencies within the state apparatus, NGOs, research institutions, to some indigenous organizations, financers, and others. These actors operate simultaneously across spatial scales. Li (2005) The standard proposed by participants in the REDD round table, which in part aimed at controlling the behaviour of unruly actors (i.e. Carbon Cowboys), invites to reflect about the porosity of the boundaries between the state and non-state. Sharma and Gupta (2006) argue that this boundary is the effect of power. Carbon accounting, certification and verification require complex knowledge which becomes a critical resource to govern REDD.
Controlling such knowledge gives considerable power to define norms to be used to produce certain social order (Foucault 1980; Jasanoff 1990; Latour 1987) . Those able to control knowledge production and dissemination arguably stand in a better position to define what norms will be used to impose social order in peaceful and orderly ways. Another role of the state that REDD might affect is its redistributive role. The quote I presented above from the civil servant from the Ministry of Environment is illustrative.
However, that redistribution of wealth has hardly happened in any country in Latin America to any substantial degree and thus, it remains more of a promise lurking in various initiatives, among others those undertaken by so-called carbon cowboys. 
